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Separate but Equal Reconsidered: Religious Education and Gender Separation 
Amir Paz-Fuchs , Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar 
ABSTRACT 
In November 2016, Britain’s High Court ruled that sex segregation in 
religious schools is not discriminatory per se and is allowed as long as girls 
and boys receive education of equal quality. This decision was reversed by 
the Court of Appeals (CoA) in October 2017.  
We critique both courts’ position on a number of fronts.  The High Court was 
quick to reject, and the CoA quick to dismiss as irrelevant, the similarit ie s 
between race segregation (deemed inherently unequal) and sex segregation 
(which is not). The courts were also wrong to dismiss the claim that sex 
segregation constitutes expressive harm to women in general.  
We examine whether religious or pedagogical considerations may override 
the argument against gender segregation, and whether institutiona l questions 
(e.g. if the school is private or public or if it is publicly funded) make a 
difference in this respect, issues not addressed by the courts.  
 
KEYWORDS: sex or gender segregation, Brown v Board of Education, religious education, 
discrimination, gender equality.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the landmark case of Brown v Board of Education,1 in which the court renounced 
racial segregation as inherently discriminatory, the idea that separation of children in educat ion 
facilities denotes a message of inferiority has reverberated in many jurisdictions. This article 
examines whether Brown’s rationale applies also to school sanctioned segregation between 
boys and girls, and especially to sex separation in religious schools. This question was 
addressed recently by Britain’s High Court in the case of X School v. Ofsted,2 in which the 
court decided that separation of girls and boys in an Islamic school is not discriminatory per 
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se, as long as the educational services supplied to both was equal. In October 2017, the Court 
of Appeal (CoA) reversed, accepting Ofsted’s position that separation was discriminatory.3  
The overarching question this case raises is whether sex segregation in schools, in and 
of itself, is discriminatory and therefore prohibited under the Equality Act 2010. We approach 
it through four related issues. First, we argue that both courts (despite their opposite rulings) 
did not properly address the similarities between race segregation and sex segregation. In the 
particular context of religious schools, we suggest that sex segregation (like racial segregation) 
may convey a message of inferiority, suggesting that girls’ (and women’s) presence in the 
male-dominated public sphere is unwelcome. Given that traditional gender roles disadvantage 
women, segregation is a social mechanism that curtails girls’ opportunities, and is therefore 
discriminatory. As a result, even if there is no evidence that the quality and content of education 
differs for boys and girls, the mere separation could bear detrimental consequences for girls.  
The second matter concerns the institutional context in which practices of sex 
segregation take place, and the role of the state and its agents (Ofsted in this case) vis-à-vis 
practices of sex segregation. Should sex segregation be treated differently when it is performed 
in schools that are privately owned and funded compared to segregation in schools funded and 
owned by the state, or is segregation equally objectionable in all institutional settings? Does 
the voluntary nature of the segregation (or lack thereof) bear on its legitimacy? 
Third, we question whether the burden of proof should have been placed on Ofsted to 
prove that segregation caused detriment, as both courts assumed, or on the school, to show that 
Ofsted’s decision (or policy) was impermissible. 
The fourth and final issue we address is the argument according to which the practice 
of sex segregation is a (religious or pedagogical) preference that parents have, and prohibit ing 
it infringes upon their right to direct the education of their children. The courts viewed the 
religious motivation as irrelevant for its assessment of the issue at hand. We question this 
assertion, and contend in contrast, that the religious character of the separation may weigh 
towards its illegality; but we also suggest that the importance of a right to religion may be able 
to justify segregation, notwithstanding its social costs.  
2. THE CASE 
                                                 





Al-Hijrah is a voluntary aided faith school with an Islamic ethos for boys and girls aged 4-16. 
As part of its Islamic ethos, the school separates boys and girls from Year 5 (age 9) in all school 
activities – lessons, assemblies, breaks, etc – creating de facto two single sex schools on one 
site.  
In June 2016, Ofsted conducted an inspection of the school after which it issued a report 
finding the school ‘inadequate’ on several grounds, which included, prominently, the complete 
segregation of boys and girls. Ofsted found that sex segregation as it was performed by the 
school is discriminatory and thus prohibited under the EqA 2010. Ofsted did not assert that 
girls in Al-Hijrah were receiving inferior education, or a differentiated curriculum. Rather, 
Ofsted stated that the pupils were not given the social skills necessary to interact with 
individuals of the opposite sex, and therefore would be inadequately prepared for their future 
lives in modern Britain. Segregation, Ofsted insisted, ‘deprives both boys and girls, in an 
equivalent way, of the opportunity to interact with the opposite sex’.4 
The school filed a claim against Ofsted’s report, arguing that merely separating boys 
and girls in itself did not constitute discrimination under EqA 2010. Since there was no 
evidence that the quality of education differed for boys and girls, Ofsted’s finding of the school 
as inadequate was without grounds.  
The legal analysis focused on sections 13 and 85 of the Equality Act. Section 13 is the 
general clause that forbids direct discrimination of an individual on the basis, inter alia, of sex. 
Located in Part 6 (Education) of EqA, section 85 forbids a school from discriminating a pupil 
in admissions (s 85(1)) and ‘in the way it provides education’, in ‘access to a benefit, facility 
or service’, or ‘any other detriment’ (respectively ss 85(2)(a), (b) and (f)). Crucially, Schedule 
11 of the Equality Act creates an important exemption for faith schools insofar as s 85(1) is 
concerned,5 but no similar exemption exists for the purpose of the rights guaranteed under s 
85(2). 
The High Court decided that segregation denies children the opportunity to interact with 
the opposite sex, and that the loss of opportunity was detrimental to children, as it failed to 
offer them opportunities or choices that reasonable people would value. However, the court 
continued, ‘the identification of a detriment is not, without more, to be equated with “less 
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favourable treatment”’, 6  as required by section 85 of the EqA. Given that ‘no materia l 
distinction is found between the two sexes’, the High Court viewed the treatment as non-
discriminatory.7 The CoA disagreed. Since the school’s boys cannot interact with girls, the 
CoA noted, each boy is treated less favourably to girls; and the same applies to girls.8 Gloster 
LJ, a minority in the CoA, went further, stating that girls suffer more significant practical and 
expressive harm from the segregation.9  
Note that while the decision and its reasoning are groundbreaking, their application are 
restricted to mixed schools (such as X school). Single sex schools are explicitly excluded from 
the provision that prohibits consideration of a student’s protected characteristic in admissions.10  
3. RACE VERSUS SEX SEGREGATION, INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GROUP 
DISCRIMINATION  
As noted, the parties agreed that the quality and content of education that Al-Hijrah supplied 
its students, boys and girls, was equal. Therefore, the issue before the court was whether 
segregation as such could constitute discrimination. Although the High Court agreed that 
segregation caused detriment to children, manifested in the loss of an opportunity to interact 
with children from the opposite sex, it found it to be a detriment that burdened children of both 
sexes equally, as the two ‘groups’ (boys and girls) were similarly segregated. The CoA took a 
very different approach, rejecting the relevance of group comparison in toto, and preferred to 
adopt an individualist, person-centred, prism: ‘girls’ should not be compared to ‘boys’; instead: 
an individual student, boy or girl, should be compared to an individual girl or boy. And it is 
found that each boy is denied the opportunity to interact with girls, which girls enjoy; and each 
girl is denied the opportunity to interact with boys, which boys enjoys. Since the deprivation 
of social interaction ‘less favourable treatment’, each boy, and each girl, are treated in a manner 
that is discriminatory.11  
We contend that both approaches are misguided. The High Court was mistaken to reject 
Ofsted’s position according to which segregation imposes a particular burden on girls because 
it perpetuates historical social inequality. And the CoA unnecessarily narrowed the analysis by 
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taking an individualistic approach. As we explain below, such an approach not only sends the 
wrong message as to the importance of group membership in general; it also misses a crucial 
opportunity to explain why some cases of segregations are discriminatory, while others are not.  
In making its argument (that segregation imposes a burden on girls that is more 
significant than that which boys experience), Ofsted referred explicitly to the landmark case of 
Brown v. Board of Education, seeking to create an analogy between racial segregation and sex-
based segregation.  
Ofsted’s and, consequently, the courts’ reference to Brown is interesting. On the one 
hand, Brown is not only a seminal ruling in the history of the American Civil Rights movement. 
Its impact reached beyond American jurisprudence, and American society. 12  Moreover, 
bearing in mind that at the heart of Brown lies the question of ‘can separate be equal’ in the 
context of education, the parties in Al-Hijrah, and the Court, would be amiss not to account for 
the similarities and dissimilarities. On the other hand, Brown is not, of course, directly 
applicable. Moreover, as a product of a very different history and legal context, caution is called 
for when considering transplanting legal doctrines and concepts from one jurisdiction into 
another. Gunther Teubner warned that such transplants may serve as ‘legal irritants’, that will 
‘unleash an evolutionary dynamic in which the external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed 
and the internal context will undergo fundamental change’.13 In particular, even within the 
context of race discrimination, the move from Brown to Al-Hijrah involves a shift from a legal 
context in which a country struggled to eradicate the legacy of slavery to a country that, 
generally, views cultural diversity as a possible positive vehicle towards integration and social 
inclusion.14  
Notwithstanding these concerns, section 13(5) of the EqA creates a legal bridge 
between American jurisprudence of the 1950s to twenty-first century Britain that, in a sense, 
makes Brown redundant, by stating that: ‘If the protected characteristic is race, less favourable 
treatment includes segregating B from others’. In other words, Britain has codified Brown in 
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legislation, so there seems no need to revert to the original source. Unless, of course, Brown 
has more to offer than disqualifying race-based segregation in education. 
To see if that is the case, we need to examine the reasoning behind the Brown decision, 
and to ask whether its rationale applies to segregation of other kinds, and in particular to sex 
segregation. There are several possible ways to understand the court’s judgment in Brown. The 
first possible interpretation of Brown is that separation in education, of any kind, cannot be 
equal. In Chief Justice Warren’s plain and probing words: ‘We conclude that, in the field of 
public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educationa l 
facilities are inherently unequal’. There is no ambiguity here, nor are there caveats (apart, 
perhaps, from tailoring the assertion only to ‘public education’). CJ Warren’s position could 
apply to all forms of ‘separation’, and not only to those based on race; whether or not the state 
is the driving force for the separation (or is, in fact, opposed to it); to separation of classrooms, 
and not only to separation of schools; and regardless of motivation, religious or otherwise. Such 
a wide interpretation of Brown would, clearly, apply to Al-Hijrah. However, it seems that it 
would also apply to a very wide category of separations, that do not seem to be as morally 
repugnant as race segregation, such as separation of students according to their age, place of 
residence, or, more controversially, their academic abilities.  
It could be argued, on the other hand, that any attempt to read into Brown an aversion 
to segregation of other sorts is misguided and artificial and that it should be interpreted as 
applying only to the facts of the case, namely to racial segregation.  
We would argue that Brown’s rationale does not apply exclusively to race. And yet, 
Brown’s rationale limits its breadth and application. CJ Warren explains that ‘to separate 
[children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community’. And, later, that ‘the policy of 
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group’.15 
Segregation, therefore, is discriminatory, unconstitutional and immoral if and when it sends a 
derogatory message to the segregated group, and is thus contingent on historical, social and 
psychological contingencies within specific societies. A third interpretation of Brown emerges, 
therefore, according to which segregation should be prohibited in cases in which it denotes a 
message of inferiority, and only in these cases.  
                                                 




Arguably, this approach perhaps aligns with a more doctrinal position, according to 
which segregation is not always suspicious, but when the allocating criterion is a protected 
characteristic (race and ethnicity, sex, nationality, sexual orientation and perhaps – age and 
disability) – it is inherently discriminatory. Such an approach seems to have guided Ofsted’s 
brief before the CoA. It stated that: ‘protected characteristics are protected because they all 
have long histories in which one group has been regarded as fundamentally different or infer ior 
in ways which … persist in power imbalances which continue to exist across society at large’.16 
According to this interpretation of Brown, sex segregation should be deemed discriminatory if 
it denotes a sense of inferiority for girls. We move on to argue that it does.  
We begin by assessing the High Court’s explicit rejection of the comparison between 
racial and sex segregation. In doing so, the High Court seems to rely, largely, on the animosity 
that drives racial segregation, an animosity that, it suggests, is far less salient in the case of sex 
segregation. Thus, the court states that ‘it was apparent that the whole point of putting these 
children in separate institutions was to emphasise their inferiority: this was precisely why the 
Southern States were doing it. It followed that the African American, profoundly aware of these 
reasons, would inevitably experience the “feeling of inferiority”’.17 Thus, despite the fact that 
the education of black pupils was not found inferior to that of white pupils, segregation was 
inherently discriminatory. This was not the case, in the court’s opinion, in the case of sex 
segregation.18  
Indeed, the extreme animosity and hostility that characterized racial segregation in the 
pre-Brown years is not demonstrated in sex segregation. An American court recently expressed 
the legal consequences of this social intuition:  
Unlike the separation of public school students by race, the separation of students 
by sex does not give rise to a finding of constitutional injury as a matter of law.  
Individuals are harmed when they attend schools in which students are separated 
on the basis of race because such separation ‘generates a feeling of inferiority . . . 
that affect [students’] hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone ’. 
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[Brown, 494]. … No such historically-grounded injury has been recognized as 
inherent in the separation of students by sex.19 
And yet, while the history of the subjugation of African-Americans is indeed different 
from the parallel history of women, one need not go far to find evidence of institutiona l, 
prevalent social prejudice and subordination throughout history, even within the very realm of 
education. Women were not admitted to the most prestigious, Ivy League universities in the 
US until as late as 1969 (Yale and Princeton), 1977 (Harvard) and even 1981 (Columbia 
University). In the UK, Oxford University began admitting female students in 1920, about 800 
years after its establishment, and even then, and for over half a century, only to far less 
prestigious, poorly equipped, all-women colleges. In other words, if the history of slavery has 
ramifications for the way we judge race segregation, centuries of excluding women from 
education must carry weight when we turn to assess sex segregation in this context. 
In doing so, we should look to the reason for excluding girls and women from the public 
sphere, including education. This exclusion is often justified, particularly in religious 
communities, by reference to the claim that co-education leads to sexual tension which is sinful. 
Girls (from a certain age) and women are viewed as responsible for this sexual tension by their 
very presence, therefore they ought to be separated from boys and men, who are, supposedly, 
the victims of this disruptive presence. The message that sexuality is threatening, and that 
women are to blame for it, is made clear to girls by way of rules and requirements regarding 
their attire, speech, and behaviour (rules that apply to their life generally, and not only in 
school).20  
Separating boys and girls in school is also justified by reference to the idea that they 
have different social roles, that they are expected to have different aspirations and to lead 
different lives. Designating separate roles for girls and boys restricts girls’ opportunit ies, 
directing them to traditional gender roles that were the basis for social exclusion and 
subordination.21 Although men too are victims of traditional gender roles, that exclude them 
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from life paths that are considered feminine, in terms of social, political and economic power, 
adhering to traditional gender roles disadvantages women more than men. Moreover, assuming 
that men and women are assigned different social roles may also implicitly suggest that women 
do not have the cognitive, physical and emotional capabilities required for roles assigned to 
men, thus clearly implying that women are inferior to men.   
Both justifications for sex segregation (preventing sin and training for different roles) 
lead to the conclusion that even if the kind of contempt and animosity that is demonstrated in 
racial segregation is absent in sex segregation, a message of inferiority is clearly present. This 
derogatory message, if internalized by girls, can foster low self-esteem and impede their 
development. Boys suffer no similar detriment, and therefore the disadvantage that boys and 
girls suffer from segregation is not parallel.  
It is important to stress that there may be cases in which sex (or, for that matter, race) 
segregation does not send this derogatory message. When single sex education is initiated and 
designed to empower girls and prepare them for leadership roles, the negative expressive 
element may be absent (although the need to separate them from boys in order to foster 
excellence may imply that they cannot compete on an equal footing to boys).22 Interestingly, 
in light of its role, single sex education can thus be justified for girls, but not necessarily for 
boys.23  For example, in the celebrated Virginia Military Institute case,24  Justice Ginsburg 
decided, for the US Supreme Court, that the Institute’s male-only admissions policy was 
unconstitutional, finding that the female alternative was a ‘pale shadow of VMI in terms of the 
range of curricular choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and 
influence’.25 In the decision, however, Justice Ginsburg voiced a positive view on single sex 
educational institutions, as long as they adhere to their mission ‘to dissipate, rather than 
perpetuate, traditional gender classifications’.26 Segregation driven by this, positive, intent ion 
may end up ultimately disadvantaging girls, however it seems that it is not wrongful in the 
same way, as it does not, a-priori, denote a message of inferiority concerning girls and the roles 
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they are destined to fill in society. The same rationale seems to apply to (far less prevalent) 
ethnic based schools designed to empower members of minority groups, which have recorded 
notable success in this regard.27  
Religious schools that favour sex separation tend to cater to communities that have a 
traditional and, consequently, patriarchal approach, which aims to perpetuate the subordinat ion 
of women by men.28 In particular, traditional religious communities tend to be very concerned 
about female modesty, as they view female sexuality as a threat, constantly tempting men 
beyond their control.29 In addition, such societies tend not to view girls, and women, as equally 
capable, talented and suited for leadership roles.   
Such attitudes can be weaved into the education of boys and girls effectively if they are 
educated separately, thus creating a strong reason to oppose separate education in religious 
schools more than separation in other institutions. As Cass Sunstein notes, ‘some of the 
pernicious forms of sex discrimination are a result of the practices of religious institutions, 
which can produce internalized norms of subordination’.30 
When segregation is driven by religious motivations, we need to examine the 
justifications of the religious commitment to determine whether the message segregation sends 
is derogatory. As we detailed above, in the case of Al-Hijrah and, perhaps, in similar cases 
concerning traditional religious schools, segregation does indeed entail a particular practical 
and expressive harm to girls. On this matter, the High Court and the majority in the CoA 
rejected Ofsted’s position. In particular, and in a manner that is unfortunate, these positions 
rested on formalistic grounds, namely – that the Ofsted report did not contain any assertion 
regarding the effect that sex segregation had on women, and the fact that it may create or 
reinforce misogynist attitudes among boys towards girls.31 
This formalist, judicial approach is disappointing. The refusal to take into account well-
established, background social circumstances that are highly pertinent to a case, tends to stand 
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in the way of progress. It is worth mentioning here one of the most celebrated legal arguments 
in the history of American litigation – the Brandeis Brief, which succeeded in convincing the 
United States’ Supreme Court to uphold a law protecting women’s health. 32  It did so by 
offering two pages of legal argument, and 96 pages of social research on the lives of working 
women. Thus, it provided ‘a healthy antidote to highly apologetic forms of discourse and 
judgment … a necessary demystifying step toward the goal of social reform’.33 
Fortunately, Gloster LJ, in the minority in the CoA, showed how the relevant 
information is not only accessible, but can also be legitimately incorporated as legally relevant. 
Though not explicitly, she seems to do so by moving from the particular (the school) to the 
general (society at large). She thus finds it extremely relevant that Ofsted’s inspectors found 
books in the school’s library that portray women as inferior, state that a woman should obey 
her husband, deny a women’s right to refuse sex to her husband and endorse a man’s right to 
beat his wife. The High Court explicitly separated this issue from the discussion regarding 
segregation, as Ofsted only cautiously suggested that the books support the argument that girls 
suffered less favourable treatment.34 However, as noted by Gloster LJ,35 this finding is highly 
relevant and can serve as an indication of the general attitude towards women that is endorsed 
by the school (irrespective, it should be emphasised here, of how ‘Islam’ in general perceives 
women, an issue that did not concern the court, and is also irrelevant for our analys is) – one 
that endorses that men’s ability ‘to dominate and chastise’ women. She similarly notes that 
students submitted work, which was approved by teachers, expressing patriarchal views such 
as ‘men should earn more as they have families to support’ and ‘women are emotiona lly 
weaker’.36  
The more general observation, discussed under the heading of ‘expressive harm’, 
suggests that gender segregation results from, and reinforces, ultra-conservative and 
fundamentalist norms, prevalent in certain interpretations of Islam, in which ‘control of women 
and, ultimately, the removal of women from the public sphere, is key’.37 In a startling show of 
judicial nerve, she asserts that the ‘fact that there has been no reported judgment to date on 
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expressive harm in domestic law does not concern me… Evidence is not needed to inform the 
court of the historic, and indeed recent and continuing, struggles of women for equal 
rights…’.38 And yet, Gloster LJ goes beyond this and refers to the Government’s (in particular 
– the Department for Communities and Local Government’s) own Casey Report, which include 
findings of ‘abuse and unequal treatment of women enacted in the name of cultural or religious 
values’.39 The fact that the majority refused to address the Report, and that the minority had to 
explicitly justify referring to it, is bemusing, and constitutes a regressive judicial approach. 
Government reports, like scholarly, academic work, should inform judicial reasoning and 
ground them in the real world. It seems paradoxical that social reality is ignored in the name 
of objective truth.  
 
4. GOD IS IN THE DETAILS: PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE AND THE POWER TO 
OPT-OUT 
The courts framed the case as dealing with the question of (sex-based) segregation as 
discrimination. However, it may be the case that institutional distinctions, primarily the 
distinction between private and public schools, have normative import.  
The United States provides an interesting base for comparison. The 1972 Education 
Amendment’s Title IX distinguishes state funded schools from privately funded schools in this 
regard, stating that ‘no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance’. 40  Notwithstanding this 
unambiguous guidance, in 2006 the US Department of Education issued a regulation which 
provided recipients of funds with the power to set up schools or classrooms that are segregated 
by sex, if they adhere to four conditions: first, the single sex class or school is motivated by the 
aims to improve educational achievement of its students and to meet their particular, identified 
needs; second, that the school implements its objectives in an ‘evenhanded’ manner; third, that 
student enrollment in the single sex class is ‘completely voluntary’; and fourth, that the school 
provides all students with a ‘substantially equal coeducational class’ in the same subject or 
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activity.41 While the regulation led to an exponential growth of both segregated schools and 
segregated classrooms (in co-ed schools) in the state sector,42 there is also evidence of judicia l 
challenges to segregation practices that were successful.43  
The second and fourth conditions seem straightforward: if girls have ‘separate but 
unequal’ facilities and opportunities or are taught in a manner that is inferior to that of girls, 
the illegality of the practice is clear. But if we are faced with a ‘separate but equal’ scenario, 
the regulations suggest that some practices may be more legitimate than others. The decision 
will depend on the degree of publicness of the school; the existence of voluntary choice; and 
the aim that drives it. We turn to address these institutional issues now, leaving the last point, 
namely the aim of segregation, for a separate discussion in the following section. 
We begin with the public nature of the school. In rejecting the analogy to Brown, the 
High Court observes that segregation in the US was mandated by the government whereas in 
the instant case the segregation was initiated and carried out by a minority school with the full 
support of the parents.44 This was significant, the court stated, because the derogatory message 
that segregation may denote is especially severe in the case of state mandated segregation that 
can reasonably be understood as the reflection of the attitudes and values of wider society. In 
our view, this is a salient point.  
All else being equal (i.e. bearing in mind a given type of segregation), it seems that the 
court should be more inclined to intervene the stronger the involvement of the state in the 
practice of segregation. This involvement may be manifested along several axis: whether the 
school is a state school or a private school; whether the segregation was initiated by the school 
or by parents; does the school receive state funding; is the school authorized and supervised by 
a state regulator; is the school a local comprehensive school or a school of choice. Amongst 
those criteria, the more the school falls on the ‘public’ side of the continuum (publicly owned, 
funded or supervised, local enrolment, school initiated segregation), the more segregation is 
problematic, as its practices can be seen (perhaps mistakenly) as deriving from society’s 
attitudes and values. In contrast, the less the state is involved in the segregation practice (a 
school is privately run, privately funded, segregation initiated by the parents and school, 
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students have an option of a different school), the expressive force of segregation is weakened. 
In some of these cases, moreover, segregation is performed by parents and communities despite 
government aversion to segregation.  
It could be argued, however, that the message that segregation conveys is received by 
the children attending the school, regardless of the nature of state involvement. The state is a 
wholly amorphous entity for children, who are more affected by the school’s concrete authority 
than by an official state message. Still, the expressive harm is no doubt worse when segregatio n 
is mandated or supported by the state.  
Where does Al-Hijrah fit within this matrix? As a ‘maintained’ school, it is overseen 
by the local authority (as distinct from the relatively new ‘free’ schools, or academies, which 
need not concern us here). Such schools must also follow the national curriculum and nationa l 
teacher pay and conditions. In addition, such schools are non-fee paying, with the local 
authority paying all running costs, central government paying 90% of building costs, leaving 
the charity with 10% of the latter.45 This leads ‘faith’ schools to be justifiably viewed as ‘state 
schools’. Interestingly, as an Islamic-based school, Al-Hijraj belongs to a very small minor ity. 
In fact, 99% of faith schools are Christian. As of 2013, there were only 12 Islamic-based 
maintained schools in the UK, alongside 34 Jewish, 2000 Roman Catholic, and 4600 Church 
of England faith-maintained schools.46 
Notwithstanding the above, faith schools are distinct from (other) state schools in three 
respects: first, the land and buildings are normally owned by a religious charity, and a 
governing body is responsible for running the school and employing the staff. Second, 
admission policy may give preference to members of a particular faith if the school is 
oversubscribed (consequently, if the school is undersubscribed, it must admit students of all 
faiths). Regrettably, the court did not expand on the admissions practice of the school, a 
consideration that could impact on the ‘voluntariness’ criterion, which in turn could be relevant 
for the analysis as a whole. Third, it may employ teachers who hold a specific faith, if it can be 
shown to be an ‘occupational requirement’.47  
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Given the mixed nature of faith-maintained schools, we argue, the expressive harm 
cannot be taken lightly. Although it is not quite as severe as state mandated de-jure segregation, 
and despite Ofsted’s active attempts to prevent it, the ties between the state and the school are 
sufficient to create the expressive harm.  
The second institutional factor that has implications for the analysis concerns the 
student, or her parent’s, power to choose whether to take part in the practice of segregation. 
This factor is more elusive than may seem, initially. One may argue that choice is guaranteed 
since students who object to segregated education may choose a different, co-educational, 
school. The courts, however, had no patience for such an argument. Regardless of whether or 
not the claimant’s case succeeded, this specific claim - that a student was not denied choice 
because she could transfer to a different school (or, in an analogous case, that an employee was 
denied choice because she could leave her job48) - was rejected.49  
Even when a coeducational option exists within the school, which was not the case in 
Al-Hijrah, parents’ choice regarding the segregated option may be deemed unsatisfactory. In a 
recent American case – Doe v Vermillion50 - the existence of classes in which children were 
separated on the basis of their sex was challenged, even though students could, formally, choose 
to study in co-educational classes. The Court of Appeals found that this ‘choice’ was not a real 
one, since the school’s Principal called parents to convince them to register their children in 
single sex classes, and the co-educational classes were disproportionately filled with children 
with special needs and lower attainment.  
This jurisprudential position, which we support, is only reinforced in the case of faith 
schools, because parents may be pressured by the community to enroll in faith schools, or 
because they genuinely feel a religious obligation to enroll their children in a religious school, 
even if they do not support sex segregation. As a result, religious parents may, at least on some 
occasions, be forced to accept sex segregation in schools as an inevitable part of their religious 
practice. 51  To be considered as a justification for segregation, choice, therefore, must be 
effective and substantive rather than formal. In the case of education, in which the individua l 
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affected by the decision, namely the child, typically has little say in the choice, the problem is 
emphasised.  
One final institutional comment concerns the difference, enshrined in the EqA, between 
single sex schools and coeducational schools to which the law, and the current ruling, do not 
apply. Clearly, if there are only boys (or girls) in a particular school, prohibition on treating 
them differently is meaningless. However, if indeed sex segregation is, in and of itself, 
demeaning to women and preserves their traditional and unequal roles in society, this argument 
applies equally to mixed schools as to, and maybe even more forcibly, same sex schools in 
which no interaction whatsoever exists between boys and girls. The existing difference in law, 
therefore, cannot be justified, and may also incentivise religious schools to transform into 
single sex schools. 52 
5. THE BURDEN OF PROOF  
Crucial to the outcome in X School was the High Court’s implicit assumptions concerning the 
party that holds the burden of proof in this case, Ofsted or Al-Hijrah, and regarding the nature 
of that burden. While the court did not refer to this issue explicitly, it assumed that the onus 
was on Ofsted to persuade the court that segregation caused detriment to girls and concluded 
that Ofsted had failed to do so. The Court of Appeal did not address this issue, but we contend 
that more should be said on this matter.  
From the American regulations depicted above, we learn that the US government is not 
agnostic insofar as sex segregation is concerned. The default normative position, and thereby 
also the default legal rule, is that boys and girls should study together,53 and American courts 
have accepted this position. Thus, the Appeals Court in Doe stated that a plaintiff who 
challenges a segregative practice ‘does not have to show discriminatory intent’. Rather, the 
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burden is placed on the party supporting the segregation ‘to demonstrate an “exceedingly 
persuasive” justification for the classification’.54 
Ofsted’s normative position is very similar to that of the American government in its 
opposition to the separation of boys and girls. As part of an Ofsted training session in 2010, 
participants were given the following instruction: 
Where a school chooses, in exceptional circumstances, to segregate lessons, 
assemblies and other activities on the basis of gender, there must be good 
educational reasons for doing so. The school will need to justify these reasons. If 
the school has a religious character it has to demonstrate how they ensure the 
religious character of the school does not disadvantage the overall education.55 
A memorandum which reflects the same approach was circulated to Ofsted officia ls. 
Moreover, this attitude reflects the approach across the wider political spectrum, and of public 
opinion, in Britain.56 In support of this normative position, one can refer to the public sector 
duty to promote equality, whose relevance the High Court was quick to dismiss,57 and the Court 
of Appeal did not address. This duty, found in section 149 of the EqA, requires a public 
authority, in the exercise of its functions, to ‘have due regard to the need’ to not only elimina te  
discrimination, but also to promote equality of opportunity and foster good relations between 
persons who share a protected characteristic and those who do not. In particular, it provides 
that this duty involves the need to tackle prejudice and promote understanding.58  In other 
words, the duty to promote equality far exceeds the obligation to eliminate discrimination.59 
Sandra Fredman, for example, notes with cautious optimism60  a series of cases in which 
challenges based on section 149 were successful in addressing redistributive ills, such as cuts 
to welfare services, 61  post office closures, 62  and the termination of funding for a social 
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programme.63 Thus, it is not the case, as the High Court would have it, that the claim that 
discrimination occurred and the breach of public sector duty ‘stand and fall together’.64 It is 
Ofsted’s public sector duty with which the court should have concerned itself, and 
reprimanding a school for segregating on the basis of sex is, quite reasonably, part of this duty. 
This interpretation of Ofsted’s public sector duty should affect, at the very least, the allocation 
of the burden of proof.  
Whether or not one agrees with the normative position, it is curious that the issue of 
burden, or onus, of proof does not appear in both courts’ decisions. This point is crucial; taking 
it seriously could have led to a very different judicial approach, and accordingly to a different 
legal outcome. For, as a matter of doctrine, the presumption of regularity – omnia 
praesumuntur rite esse acta – suggests that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is 
presumed that a public body acted on the basis of existing evidence and followed proper 
procedures.65 Even more relevant is the deference doctrine, according to which, barring serious 
evidence to the contrary, courts should presume that government agencies are better positioned 
to interpret the statutes that governs their work.66 At the very least, it is up to the claimant to 
challenge the agency’s understanding of the statute. Instead, the High Court seemed to frame 
the challenge for Ofsted, the respondent, very differently. It was the government agency that 
was set a relatively high bar: a constitutional challenge – to prove that discrimination occurred. 
This bar required not only proving that girls (and boys) suffered a detriment by lack of choice 
(a point that the court was willing to concede),67 but also that that detriment amounted to ‘less 
favourable treatment’, under the EqA. Arguably, a more fitting legal framework would be to 
place the onus on the claimant, the school, to challenge Ofsted’s decision through 
administrative tools, namely to prove why it was impermissible for Ofsted, as a regulator, to 
evaluate a school negatively due to an educational practice that causes detriment to its students.  
Indeed, it seems that the school assumed the mindset we advocate, and submitted ten 
grounds of challenge, of which the majority were administrative: irrationality, bias, ultra vires, 
lack of evidence, and lack of warning. Only two grounds, which converged into one, focused 
on the fact that the separation under inquiry was not discriminatory under the EqA. And yet, 
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these were the grounds on which the courts based their decisions. But, again, Ofsted should 
not be forced to establish that separation was discriminatory under EqA, but merely that 
it was within Ofsted’s discretion to negatively assess a school performing it. Interestingly, 
the claimant did not put forward a constitutional argument that it had at its disposal: one which 
refers to the religious nature of the school, and the respective rights of children and parents, a 
matter to which we turn to now.  
6. RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS AND PARENTAL PREFERENCES  
The discussion above suggests that the motivation behind segregation often plays a part in 
discerning the message conveyed by segregation. There is often a direct link between the 
motivation underlying segregation and what segregation expresses. And yet, both courts state 
that if sex segregation was deemed discriminatory, the fact that the motive for segregation is 
religious (rather than some other animosity toward a particular protected group) is irrelevant.68  
At one point, the CoA seemed to tread some way towards a different approach, which 
takes into account the reason for segregation, by highlighting cases which, under Schedule 3, 
paragraph 27 of the EqA 2010, provision of a service solely to a member of one sex is not 
illegal sex discrimination. These cases, derived from the Explanatory Notes, include separate 
male and female wards in a hospital; separate male and female changing rooms in a department 
store; and a massage service provided to women only by a female therapist in her clients’ homes 
because she feels uncomfortable massaging men in that environment. 69  But later on, it 
explicitly rejects motive as relevant stating that: ‘it is common ground, and well-established by 
authority, that the motive for discrimination is irrelevant’.70 In its reasoning, the CoA refers to 
the JFS case,71 in which the Supreme Court noted that relying on a religious reason cannot be 
exculpatory, if the result is discriminatory. We suggest, however, that the irrelevance of 
motivation should be limited to circumstances when the defendant seeks to use it as a shield, 
claiming that the discrimination was not driven by an intent to exclude or humiliate a particular 
group, but rather by a more general (often – religious) basis. It would seem awkward, however, 
to derive the reverse conclusion from this approach, i.e. that such a motivation (i.e. to exclude 
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or humiliate) should not be relevant when assessing if discrimination is legal, or not. Indeed, it 
seems that our understanding is accepted by the High Court, which noted that if Ofsted would 
have been able to establish that ‘Islamic schools segregate because their religion (or their 
interpretation of it) views girls and women as second-class citizens, I would have been duty-
bound to address the issue’.72 In other words, the reason, or motivation, is completely relevant, 
if it is a nefarious one.  
Above we discussed the potentially negative role that religious motivations play in the 
context of sex segregation. We now address the possibility that religious justification may 
redeem objectionable separation.  
A religious motivation for segregation, we argued above, does not rule out the 
discriminatory nature of segregation, which is associated with the derogatory message it 
denotes. In the case of religious schools, sex segregation typically sends a message of 
inferiority toward girls and is therefore discriminatory in much the same way that race 
segregation is degrading for racial minorities. Therefore, as the court stresses, merely 
establishing that a religious requirement underlies segregation does not rule out discrimination.  
However, the fact that segregation is motivated by religious commitments may have 
redeeming qualities, legally speaking. Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
provides the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. And Article 2 of the First 
Protocol to the ECHR provides that 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the 
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions. 
This constitutional and philosophical approach is made concrete within the EqA itself. 
Thus, while section 85(1) forbids discrimination in admissions, and section 85(2) forbids 
discrimination in treatment, Part 2, paragraph 5 of Schedule 11 disapplies these sections with 
regards to ‘schools of religious character’ and with respect to ‘matters relating to religion or 
belief’. While it is not clear whether sex segregation falls within such matters, it should be 
stated that those are clearly broader than acts of worship or religious observance, which are 
                                                 




treated separately within Schedule 11 (paragraph 6). Curiously, this was not mentioned in the 
judgment.  
It seems, therefore, that contra to the courts’ assertions, a religious argument voiced by 
parents in favour of sex segregation in religious schools might outweigh an antidiscrimina tion 
requirement. Comparing sex segregation to race segregation in this respect reveals an 
interesting dis-analogy. In two American cases, involving sectarian schools that facially 
discriminated on the basis of race and were argued to be justified on a religious basis, the courts 
concluded that there had not been a bona fide religious concern, and so neither court had to 
confront the issue of whether religious argument could override the prohibition on 
segregation.73  It is not, we think, a coincidence that the courts were not persuaded by the 
schools’ religious claim because, unlike sex-based segregation, race segregation is not a 
common requirement of the main religious denominations. Therefore, the different intuit ions 
we may have regarding race and sex segregation, namely that religious conviction cannot 
justify racial segregation but can justify sex segregation, may simply hinge on the fact that we 
do not believe that religions truly demand racial separation. Instead, we are inclined to think, 
religious arguments are simply used to mask racism. Sex segregation does not raise the same 
suspicion, mainly because we are indeed familiar with religious requirements to separate men 
and women in many spheres.  
One may even argue that the public sector duty, discussed above, should operate not 
only to accommodate girls and women, but also religious minorities (in this case – Muslim 
parents) and to promote inclusive policies.74  
Should religious justifications override the concern for equality, assuming that sex 
segregation indeed has a sincere religious justification? Clearly, some kind of balance must be 
struck, yet it is unclear what this balance should be.  The argument that a particular practice is 
justified, or even mandated, by religion, should not be accepted without scrutiny. It is true that 
in Eweida, the European Court of Human Rights rejected the domestic (British) courts’ 
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approach, maintaining that while freedom of religion must refer to a belief system that ‘denotes 
views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance ’, where those 
are established, ‘the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power 
on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs 
are expressed’.75 But it also continues to note that ‘it cannot be said that every act which is in 
some way inspired, motivated or influenced by it constitutes a “manifestation” of the belief’.76 
In particular, while the British Government’s argument (that the wearing of a cross was not a 
manifestation of belief) was rejected in the instant case, the Court cited with agreement two 
earlier cases of relevance. In the first, the House of Lords rejected the claim that the ban on 
corporal punishment in schools interfered with the claimants’ religious beliefs.77 Lord Nicholls 
stated that the court will recognise a belief worthy of protection only if it satisfied ‘some 
modest, objective minimum requirements … The belief must be consistent with basic standards 
of human dignity and integrity’.78 In the second case, a 14-year old Muslim girl refused to 
attend a secular, maintained school if it would not allow her to wear a jilbab – a long, coat-like 
garment.79  The school, it should be noted, was composed of 79% Muslim students, had a 
female Muslim Head teacher and allowed for three uniform options, of which one – the shalwar 
kameeze, was worn by Muslim, Hindu and Sikh female students. The House of Lords rejected 
the student’s claim but differed on the rationale. Lord Scott, for example, suggested that Article 
9 was not engaged at all, as ‘“Freedom to manifest one’s religion” does not mean that one has 
the right to manifest one’s religion at any time and in any place and in any manner that accords 
with one’s beliefs’.80 Baroness Hale, in contrast, was ready to accept that there was interference 
with Article 9, but such interference was justified, as it ‘had the legitimate aim of protecting 
the rights and freedoms of others’.81 
Another relevant consideration in this regard is the extent to which a prohibition of sex 
separation will elicit fierce objection on the part of religious communities, that will have a 
backlash effect. For example, if believers view sex segregation as a crucial tenet of their faith, 
state coercion may be ineffective. Parents will prefer to withdraw their children from schools 
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altogether – choosing possibilities such as home schooling or private religious schools in their 
stead. This option may be worse for girls, who may be denied the benefits of state education 
that, notwithstanding the segregation, is still preferable in terms of their prospects and equality.     
The fact that segregation was motivated by religious reasons, therefore, does carry 
normative weight that can bear on the desirable legal outcome. It will have to be considered 
alongside the extent of the detriment caused by segregation, determined among other things by 
the institutional circumstances described in the previous section, as well as more general social 
circumstances (such as other informal educational activities that may be co-educational, the 
extent of gender inequality experienced by the children, etc) that can alleviate or aggravate the 
harm caused by segregation. 
Viewing the religious argument as a separate consideration that may, in some cases, 
override the prohibition on segregation, rather than as part of the inquiry toward whether 
segregation was discriminatory, is an attractive way to think about this complicated normative 
question. It enables us to maintain an unwavering aversion toward sex segregation in religious 
schools, insisting that it perpetuates the inferior status of women, especially in religious 
communities, and yet, to recognize the moral and legal complexity of interference in religious 
communities’ education systems. This position balances the conflicting interests involved 
within the complicated realm of religious education. It is also in line with current legal and 
educational practice, in the UK and beyond, in which religious schools of many denominations 
practice sex segregation. While this practice should be discouraged, it is unlikely to be 
eliminated altogether.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Education systems in multicultural societies face the challenging dilemma of allowing parents 
and communities to educate their children in accordance with their beliefs and values, while 
not renouncing the system’s commitment to liberal values such as gender equality and its 
responsibility to ensure the development and autonomy of the children belonging to the 
religious communities. In commenting on the case of Al-Hijrah we do not purport to offer a 
comprehensive argument regarding the permissibility of sex segregation in religious schools . 
What the discussion does suggest, however, is that sex segregation, at least in religious schools,  
cannot be accepted uncritically. If, as we posit, sex-segregation denotes a message of 




(private or public; state funded or not; the voluntary nature of the segregation), this requires a 
thorough rethinking of the desirable reaction toward religious schools that separate boys and 
girls.  
Considering that sex segregated religious schools are a common phenomenon, 
prohibiting sex segregation within co-educational schools entails a radical change from the 
status quo. Moreover, the fact that some of these schools are considering, following the 
decision by the CoA, to transform into single sex schools which, for the time being, and 
somewhat paradoxically, are not illegal, is yet another example of the unintended, and even 
regressive, consequences of legal decisions that seem, facially, to be progressive.   
While this should not, in itself, deter policy makers from pursuing a desirable policy, it 
raises doubt as to whether full prohibition is a feasible option at this time, and perhaps more 
piecemeal solutions should be adopted. Arguably, Ofsted, the accountable and professiona l 
agency in this regard, sought to test the waters and carve a path along those lines. While 
reasonable people may disagree with its conclusion, we suggest that such a discussion must 
take into account, rather than ignore, the issues raised here.  
 
